The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A Reaffirmation of Fundamental Rights by Howard, Jean G.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
3-1-1979
The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A
Reaffirmation of Fundamental Rights
Jean G. Howard
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review
by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jean G. Howard, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A Reaffirmation of Fundamental Rights, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 691 (1979)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol33/iss3/7
NOTES
ble pretenses must be found for removing or hoodwinking, one
after another, those sentries who are posted by the constitution
of a free country for warning the people of their danger. 9
In KQED, the Court is a constitutional sentry fallen asleep. It
has failed to protect meaningful access to publically supported pen-
ological facilities and, presumably, to "all other public facilities
such as hospitals and mental institutions."' 0
TERESA L. MussETTo
The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A
Reaffirmation of Fundamental Rights
In this note, the author examines the continuing debate over
the role of the judiciary in reviewing state legislative acts and
indicates the continued reluctance of the Supreme Court of the
United States to expand the content of rights protected under the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV and the fourteenth
amendment. The author concludes that the present refusal of the
Court to impose its own value judgments over those of the state
legislature is consistent with the purpose and past interpretation
of the privileges and immunities clause, absent a conflict with
other rights of the Constitution.
A Montana resident, who was licensed by the state as a hunting
guide, and four nonresident hunters sued the Fish and Game Com-
mission of Montana in federal district court' seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief from a discriminatory licensing scheme. Under
this scheme, nonresidents were charged between seven and one-half
to twenty-five times more than residents for elk hunting privileges.'
A three-judge district court, in a two to one decision, held that the
licensing scheme as applied to nonresidents did not violate the Con-
stitution on the grounds that the asserted right was not one that was
59. E. WALFORD, SPEECHES OF THOMAS LORD ERSKINE 336 (1870), quoted in First Amend-
ment Balance, supra note 22, at 1424.
60. 98 S. Ct. at 2597.
1. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D.
Mont. 1976).
2. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 26-202.1(4), (12), 26-230 (Supp. 1977) provide that a
Montana resident can purchase a license solely for elk for $9, while a nonresident must
purchase a license which entitles him to take one elk, one deer, one black bear, and game
birds, and to fish with hook and line for a fee of $225. Under these statutes, a resident can
enjoy all of the privileges granted to the nonresident under the combination license for only
$30.
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fundamental under the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV.' In discussing the equal protection challenge, the district court
also found that the right to hunt elk for sport was not fundamental
for equal protection purposes.' The Montana statute, therefore,
failed to trigger a strict scrutiny analysis. The court upheld the
statute on equal protection grounds as bearing a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state purpose.' The dissenting judge believed
that the fee differential provision failed under the equal protection
clause because the state could not justify the discrimination.' On
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held, affirmed:
Access by nonresidents to recreational elk hunting in Montana was
not protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Consti-
tution of the United States. The differentiation within the fee
schedule between resident and nonresident hunters was rationally
related to preservation of a finite resource and to the state's interest
in regulating its wildlife, and thus did not violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
The Baldwin decision reflects a basic philosophical difference
among members of the Burger Court as to when and to what extent
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 permits
the Supreme Court to review the acts of state legislatures which
discriminate against nonresidents. The majority viewed the privi-
leges and immunities clause as permitting judicial intervention into
the political process of a state only when a right fundamental to the
maintenance of the federal scheme is involved; that is, a privilege
and immunity of national citizenship protected by article IV, sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opin-
ion, saw the privileges and immunities clause as requiring judicial
intervention into the political process of a state whenever a legisla-
tive act discriminates against a nonresident.'
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, cited Paul v.
Virginia,' Hague v. CIO, "0 and Austin v. New Hampshire" in dem-
3. 417 F. Supp. at 1009. Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution provides: "The Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States."
4. 417 F. Supp. at 1005.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1010.
7. 436 U.S. at 383.
8. Id. at 400. Justices White and Marshall joined in the dissent.
9. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (held only natural persons are entitled to protection of
privileges and immunities clause).




onstrating that the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause
was to strengthen the union by preventing discrimination among
citizens of different states. 2 By looking to specific cases, the Court
determined that there were three areas in which the privileges and
immunities clause had been applied to prevent discrimination
against nonresidents. These areas included: the pursuit of commer-
cial livelihood, 13 ownership and disposition of privately held prop-
erty," and access to the courts of the state."5 The Court noted that
the clause did not mean that a state was without power to discrimi-
nate at all between residents and nonresidents." Addressing the
issues of legislative purpose, the Court determined that the regula-
tion of wildlife within a state's borders is a proper exercise of state
power" as long as such regulation does not impede interstate com-
merce 8 or other proper exercise of federal power.8 The Court con-
cluded that the means employed by the Montana Legislature did
not infringe upon rights fundamental to national unity and that the
end, regulation of elk hunting, was a proper legislative purpose. 0
An analysis of the history of the privileges and immunities
clause indicates that the majority's interpretation of the clause as
providing a list of protected privileges and immunities is consistent
with precedent. A close reading of the cases also suggests that the
11. 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (held New Hampshire Commuters Income Tax an invidious
discrimination).
12. For a comparison of the majority view and the dissent by Justice Brennan, see text
accompanying notes 63-73 infra.
13. E.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (aliens must be
granted commercial fishing licenses); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (commercial
shrimp fishing in marginal sea); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870) (Maryland
statute imposed discriminatory licensing fee on nonresident traders).
14. E.g., Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898) (resident creditors of corporation may
not be given preference over nonresident creditor).
15. E.g., Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) (nonresident has a year in which
to bring action).
16. E.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (state interest exists to require petitioner in
divorce suit to reside in state one year prior to action).
17. E.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (state may forbid killing of woodcock,
ruffled grouse and quail for purposes of interstate shipment); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876) (held statute prohibiting citizens of other states from planting oysters in Virginia
river invalid).
18. E.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (Louisiana could not
prohibit exportation of locally caught shrimp from which heads and shells had not been
removed as it acted to obstruct interstate commerce); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas producers may not give first preference to local customers).
19. E.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (Federal Enrollment and
Licensing Act preempted Virginia statute prohibiting nonresidents' federally licensed vessels
from fishing in Virginia); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (federal government
may regulate wild horses and burros on federal land); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)
(federal treatymaking power extends to migratory birds within state).
20. 436 U.S. at 390.
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dissent's view of the clause as establishing a "nonresident" as a
member of suspect classification or as requiring judicial scrutiny as
a matter of due process2 is contrary to historical concepts of federal-
ism .2
The term "fundamental right" was first used in conjunction
with the privileges and immunities clause in 1823 in Corfield v.
Coryell.11 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Baldwin, argued that
Corfield should, in effect, be overruled." Citing Professor Tribe's
comment that Justice Washington was attempting to "import the
natural rights doctrine into the Constitution by way of the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV,' 25 Justice Brennan argued that
the fundamental rights concept, in terms of the privileges and im-
munities clause, was synonymous with a natural rights theory. Be-
cause modern constitutional law no longer views the natural rights
theory as giving content to protected rights, Justice Brennan be-
lieves "the time has come to confirm explicitly that. . . an inquiry
into whether a given right is 'fundamental' has no place in our
analysis of whether a State's discrimination against nonresidents
. . . violates the Clause. '26
But Justice Washington did not read the theory of natural
rights into the Constitution. As Professor Tribe admits, the theory
had always been present. 7 In Corfield, Justice Washington simply
21. Id. at 400 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (scrutiny triggered because nonresidents not
represented in legislative halls of the discriminating state).
22. For a definition of federalism, see Diamond, Commentaries on the Federalist, 86
YALE L. J. 1273 (1977).
23. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (Washington, Circuit Justice) (non-
citizens have no right to gather shellfish in New Jersey waters). Justice Washington identified
the following as "fundamental rights" guaranteed by the privileges and immunities clause:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind
in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or
personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions.than are paid by the
other citizens of the state; . . . to which may be added, the elective franchise, as
regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to
be exercised.
Id. at 552.
24. 436 U.S. at 402.
25. Id. at 396 (citing L. TRmE, AMgpiCAN CONsTrrMONAL LAW 405-06 (1978)).
26. Id. at 402.
27. L. TawIE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw 427 (1978).
The notion that governmental authority has implied limits which preserve
private autonomy predates the establishment of the American republic. During
the 17th and 18th centuries, there evolved an American tradition of "natural
law," postulating that "certain principles of right and justice . . . are entitled to
prevail of their own intrinsic excellence." . . . Just as each of the three branches
of the federal government was bound to remain within its proper jurisdiction, so
[Vol. 33:667
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defined those privileges and immunities, those "natural rights,"
which the framers had assumed to be implicit in the Constitution
as a social contract.
The majority in Baldwin also defined the phrase "privileges
and immunities." As Justice Blackmun noted, both decisions used
the concept of "fundamental" in the same sense, that of a basic
right.2' Thus, while the Court in Corfield had relied on a historical
definition of natural rights, the Court in Baldwin relied on history
in terms of constitutional interpretation both before and after adop-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The latter approach is consistent
with Justice Washington's interpretation of the privileges and im-
munities clause, an interpretation which has been almost uniformly
accepted to the present day.2'
The adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 brought
hope that the privileges or immunities provision in section 1 of that
amendment"e would provide protection for rights not specifically
listed in the Constitution or considered fundamental to national
unity under the Corfield definition of the privileges and immunities
clause."' That hope was dashed by the Court's decision in the
the state or federal government as a whole had no power to act outside its rightful
jurisdiction to intrude upon the "natural rights" reserved to the people ....
Id. (footnotes and quotations omitted).
28. 436 U.S. at 387.
29. The one right not listed by Justice Washington, but now considered by the Court to
be fundamental, is the right to privacy. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (right to privacy encompasses woman's decision whether to termi-
nate pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy protects
decision whether to bear or beget a child). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 H'Av. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
The right to travel was suggested by Justice Washington in Corfield. See note 23 supra.
See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (durational residence requirement for
voting directly impinges upon exercise of constitutional right to travel); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (residency requirements inhibit welfare recipient's right to
travel); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (freedom to travel throughout the
United States recognized as a basic right under the Constitution); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 165 (1941) (statute struck down as impermissible burden on interstate travel of
indigent persons).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 which provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
31. See Live-Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408) (Bradley, Circuit
Justice):
The new prohibition that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" is not
19791
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Slaughter-House Cases.32 Fearing that the fourteenth amendment
was a threat to state sovereignty, Justice Miller found that the
privileges and immunities clause "did not create those rights, which
are called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. It
threw around them . . . no security for the citizen of the State in
which they were claimed or exercised." 3 The effect of the Slaughter-
House decision was to establish that the fundamental rights as de-
fined by the Corfield interpretation of the privileges and immunities
clause were rights of federal citizenship.' It also served to merge the
"privileges or immunities" of the fourteenth amendment with the
privileges and immunities language of article IV, section 2.31
This confusion over the relationship of the two constitutional
provisions was initially of little significance in equal protection
analysis. Equal protection challenges arise when the government
attempts to classify certain persons in a manner different from those
similarly situated. Traditionally, the Court has analyzed equal pro-
tection challenges by determining whether the classification pro-
vided by the contested statute is reasonably related to a legislative
purpose of promoting the general good." Consideration of whether
a right was fundamental often played no part in its analysis. The
definition of "fundamental rights," however, took on new import-
ance in the 1960's when the Warren Court introduced the two-tiered
standard of strict scrutiny into equal protection analysis.
Under the strict scrutiny analysis, the Court first determines
whether a "suspect" classification or a "fundamental right" or
"interest" is involved. If so, then strict scrutiny is called for and the
identical with the clause in the Constitution which declared that "the citizens of
each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several states." It embraces much more.
32. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
33. Id. at 77; see id. at 78 for a statement of Justice Miller's concern for state sovereignty.
34. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 510 (1939). The first sentence of the amendment
settled the old controversy as to citizenship by providing that "[a]ll persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the States wherein they reside." Thenceforward citizenship of the United States
became primary and citizenship of a state became secondary.
35. 435 U.S. at 330 (relationship between the privileges and immunities clauses of article
IV and the fourteenth amendment "less than" clear).
36. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (affording continuing protection to
public is a reasonable legislative purpose) (overruled by City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976)); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (legislature may have
had reasonable purpose in discrimination between opticians and seller of ready-to-wear
glasses). For cases stating that a strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to state
statutes, see, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 424-26 (1961); United States v. Des




state must show a substantial and compelling reason for treating
individuals differently. If the Court determines that neither a
"suspect" classification nor a "fundamental right" or "interest" is
involved, then the state must show a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate legislative purpose. 7
The case of Shapiro v. Thompson38 is considered to be a classic
example of the fundamental rights strand of strict scrutiny analysis.
In Shapiro, the Court determined that a state statute which re-
quired a period of residency before one could become eligible for
welfare benefits restricted the exercise of the right to travel.39 The
strict scrutiny standard was applied due to the involvement of a
fundamental right. The Court could find no compelling state inter-
est justifying the residency requirement and thus held the statute
to be an invidious discrimination against nonresidents." In his dis-
sent, Justice Harlan disapproved of both the compelling govern-
mental interest test and, in particular, of the fundamental rights
strand of this test. He feared that because virtually every state
statute affects important rights, any challenge under equal protec-
tion would be given strict scrutiny." This fear was based upon his
conviction that the judiciary should neither impose its beliefs onto
the Constitution,"2 nor inject itself into the political process by un-
necessarily reviewing the acts of the state legislatures. 3
Justice Harlan's fears appeared to be justified when the C ourt
subsequently applied a compelling state interest test in Dunn v.
Blumstein." By finding that residency requirements for voting im-
pinged upon the fundamental fight to travel, the Court apparently
37. For discussions of the Court's attempts to develop equal protection analyses, see
Benoit, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can There Be
Life After Death, 11 SUFFOLK L. REV. 61 (1976); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause:
"Its Hour Come Round At Last?," 1972 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 405; Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975); Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Comment, Fundamental Personal
Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 807 (1973).
38. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
39. Id. at 629-31.
40. Id. at 638.
41. Id. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. "I know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities,
characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection under an unusually
stringent equal protection test." Id. at 662.
43. Id. at 666-76.
44. 405 U.S. 330 (1972); e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). But see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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limited the ability of a state to legislate on the subject of election
franchise." However, the fear that the compelling state interest test
would "swallow the standard equal protection rule"" was assuaged
by the Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,4" wherein
it was held that education was not a fundamental right. Although
the Court noted that education was of "undisputed importance,""
the Court chose to discredit the "interest" strand of the strict scru-
tiny test and to define fundamental right solely as one provided for
in the Constitution."
Two years after the Rodriguez decision, a New Hampshire com-
muters income tax was challenged under the privileges and immuni-
ties and equal protection clauses of the constitutions of New Hamp-
shire and the United States. In Austin v. New Hampshire,50 the
court found that the statute violated the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV, section 2, and should be subjected to more than
a minimum scrutiny analysis.5' Instead of basing its decision on the
concept of rights fundamental to the maintenance of a federal
scheme, the Court determined that the privileges and immunities
clause created a "suspect" classification-nonresidents."2 Applying
a "middle level" of scrutiny, the Court concluded that the tax was
invalid under the privileges and immunities clause and never
reached the equal protection issue. The Burger Court originally ap-
plied this sliding scale or "newer equal protection" analysis5 3 to
fourteenth amendment challenges. Under this standard, the Court
will apply a "middle level" of scrutiny even though there is no
suspect class or fundamental right involved. Certain classifications
do not rise to the level of "suspect," but nevertheless require a
higher level of scrutiny.5 This newer standard requires that the
45. 405 U.S. at 338-39.
46. 394 U.S. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973); cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924) (Oregon law
requiring compulsory attendance of children at public schools unconstitutional deprivation
of parental right to direct education of child).
48. Id. at 35.
49. "[T7he key to discovering whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance . . . . Rather, the answer lies in assessing
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
Id. at 33-34.
50. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
51. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
52. 420 U.S. at 662.
53. See Gunther, supra note 37, at 20-48.
54. For example, race is considered to be a suspect class because the individual cannot
choose which race to belong to, he cannot change his condition, and race has traditionally
carried a burden of stigma in many circumstances. Other classifications which warrant
greater scrutiny but which do not rise to the level of "suspect," include sex, Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating statute prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer to males under age 21
[Vol. 33:667
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means used to carry out the challenged statute must not be merely
rational but must serve the actual and articulated purposes of the
statute.55 The Court in Austin extended the use of this middle level
of scrutiny to the privileges and immunities clause.
In Baldwin, the Court was again faced with an action brought
directly under the privileges and immunities clause. The Court re-
jected the prior interpretation of the privileges and immunities
clause articulated in Austin and reaffirmed Justice Washington's
definition in Corfield of that clause in terms of rights fundamental
to the maintenance of the Union.5" Believing that the consideration
of fundamental rights was the basis for the Court's decision in Paul
v. Virginia57 and in subsequent cases decided under the privileges
and immunities clause, Justice Blackmun concluded that "[wJith
respect to such basic and essential activities, interference with
which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union,
the States must treat residents and nonresidents without unneces-
sary distinctions."58 Whether the phrase "basic and essential
activities" was an attempt by the Court to provide a more inclusive
definition of fundamental rights than that traditionally associated
with the privileges and immunities clause will have to be deter-
mined by future courts.
There is no doubt, however, that the Court in Baldwin reaf-
firmed that the privileges and immunities clause was meant to pro-
tect the type of fundamental rights listed in Corfield.1 Elk hunting
for sport is not an activity involving livelihood, nor is access to
Montana elk basic to the maintenance of the Union. The Court
concluded that recreational elk hunting is not a fundamental right
or activity of the type protected by the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV, section 2.80
The Court also considered the equal protection challenge in
and females under age 18); illegitimacy, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (invalidating
illegitimacy clause in Illinois law governing intestate succession); and alienage, Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (invalidating Civil Service Commission regulation barring
resident aliens from employment in the federal competitive civil service). But see Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding alien's eligibility for participation in federal Medicare
program after continuous residence in the United States for five year period and after admis-
sion for permanent residence).
55. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 511 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
56. See note 23 supra.
57. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
58. 436 U.S. at 387.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 388.
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terms of its analysis of the privileges and immunities clause. Be-
cause the Court had determined that a fundamental right under
article IV was not present, strict scrutiny and the compelling state
interest test was not used. Justice Blackmun simply applied the
traditional test of rational relationship to legislative purpose and
found that "[tihe legislative choice was an economic means not
unreasonably related to the preservation of a finite resource and a
substantial regulatory interest of the State."'"
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, never reached the
issue of equal protection. 2 Instead, he found power to review the
state action in the privileges and immunities clause. He relied upon
Toomer v. Witsell" for the proposition that the role of the Court in
any privileges and immunities challenge is to review actions of state
legislatures to determine whether: "(1) the presence or activity of
nonresidents is the source or cause of the problem or effect with
which the State seeks to deal; and (2) the discrimination practiced
against nonresidents bears a substantial relation to the problem
they present."" Justice Brennan argued that the Constitution re-
quires automatic judicial review of decisions of state legislatures
which affect nonresidents: "[A]n inquiry into whether a given right
is 'fundamental' has no place in our analysis of the privileges and
immunities clause."" Case precedent, however, is consistent in re-
quiring that a right fundamental to national unity be present before
the Court is justified in applying a greater than minimum rational-
ity test to actions of state legislatures challenged under the privi-
leges and immunities clause."
61. Id. at 390. The Court listed the following as reasonable grounds for the adoption of a
licensing differential for hunters: (1) nonresidents did not pay the taxes to support the pro-
duction and maintenance of big game populations; (2) there was a great influx of nonresident
hunters, many of whom did not know a deer from an elk; (3) group hunting by nonresidents
threatened license "swapping"; (4) the elk supply was limited; (5) short-term visitors were
more likely to commit game violations; and (6) hunting practices need supervision in order
to prevent violations and illegal overkill. Id.
62. Because I find Montana's elk licensing scheme unconstitutional under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, I find it unnecessary to
determine whether the scheme would pass equal protection scrutiny. In any event,
where a State discriminates solely on the basis of noncitizenship or nonresidency
in the State. . .it is my view that the Equal Protection Clause affords a discrimi-
natee no greater protection than the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
436 U.S. at 406 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. 334 U.S. 386 (1948).
64. 436 U.S. at 402.
65. Id.
66. The fact that case law may bear but a tenuous relationship to a current decision is
not by itself enough to invalidate an opinion. See E. LMv, AN IMnODUcON To LEGAL
REASONING (1949).
There can be no authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. The Constitu-
tion in its general provisions embodies the conflicting ideals of the community.
[Vol. 33:667
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Justice Brennan argued that the Court in Paul v. Virginia7 and
Toomer v. Witsell" interpreted the privileges and immunities clause
as "prohibiting a State from unjustifiably discriminating against
nonresidents"" and was not concerned with the question of funda-
mental rights.7" The dissent interpreted the Paul and Toomer deci-
sions as requiring a state legislature to justify to the federal govern-
ment any act which treats nonresidents less favorably than resi-
dents. This interpretation, however, is not in accord with the deci-
sions in Paul and Toomer.
The focus of the Court in Paul was on fundamental rights and
whether these rights extended to the corporation. 7 The Court held
that corporations were not entitled to the privileges and immunities
guaranteed by the clause because corporations were only entitled to
state rights; that is, corporations were merely legal entities whose
existence was determined solely by the state of incorporation.7" The
Court held that the privileges and immunities clause extended only
to natural persons, presumably on the theory that natural persons,
unlike corporations, had made a compact with the federal govern-
ment and, as a result, enjoy certain national rights which they carry
into other states without fear of discrimination. One of these rights
Who is to say what these ideals mean in any definite way? Certainly not the
framers . . Nor can it be the Court for the Court cannot bind itself in this
manner; an appeal can always be made back to the Constitution ....
(C]onstitutional interpretation cannot be as consistent as case-law development
or the application of statutes. The development proceeds in shifts; occasionally
there are abrupt changes in direction. . . .There will be some consistency, but
it is not the consistency of case law or statute . . . .There is an affirmative
recognition in a constitutional case that the problem is the connection between
what is sought to be done and the ideals of the community ....
.. The emphasis should be on the process. The contrast between logic
and the actual legal method is a disservice to both. Legal reasonining has a logic
of its own. Its structure fits it to give meaning to ambiguity and to test constantly
whether the society has come to see new differences or similarities.
Id. at 58-60, 104.
67. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-85 (1868).
68. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
69. 436 U.S. at 397.
70. Id. at 397-98. All of the other cases Justice Brennan cited in his Baldwin dissent
explicitly involved a right considered to be fundamental by the Court. In Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975), the Court cited Corfield as evidence that "'an exemp-
tion from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by other citizens of the state'" was one
of the fundamental rights protected by the privileges and immunities clause. But see Chem-
ung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72 (1876), wherein the Court failed to mention rights
when discussing whether there was a justification for a state statute which tolled the statute
of limitations on a cause of action against a defendant absent from the state only when the
plaintiff was a state resident.
71. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 177-85.
72. Id.
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of national citizenship is the right to commercial livelihood. The
Paul decision does not suggest, as Justice Brennan indicated, that
"Justice Washington's view was seemingly discarded in Paul...
and replaced by the view that the measure of the rights secured to
nonresidents was the extent of the rights afforded by a State to its
own citizens."
Justice Brennan also read the majority's reliance on the con-
cept of fundamental rights out of Toomer. He asserted: "Although
the Court in Toomer did 'hold that commercial shrimping in the
marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the privileges
and immunities clause,' . . . its statement to this effect was con-
clusory and clearly secondary to its extensive analysis of whether
South Carolina's discrimination against nonresidents was properly
justified."7 Justice Brennan found support for this interpretation in
another section of the Toomer opinion:
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and
immunities clause is not absolute. It does bar discrimination
against citizens of other States where there is no substantial rea-
son for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are
citizens of other States. But this does not preclude disparity of
treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid
independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry* in each case must
be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the
degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The in-
quiry must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the
principle that the States should have considerable leeway in ana-
lyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures."6
Justice Brennan further claimed that since no fundamental interest
was involved in Toomer, South Carolina had only to satisfy a ra-
tional basis test under the traditional equal protection standard. 6
Because the stricter scrutiny was applied, the standard under the
privileges and immunities clause must have differed. He argued
that the greater scrutiny was permissible because the "classification
based on the fact of noncitizenship was constitutionally infirm."77
Logically, this should create a suspect class and evoke the standard
of strict scrutiny and the compelling state interest test. Justice
Brennan, however, invoked the concept of the sliding scale or mid-
73. 436 U.S. at 397.
74. Id. at 401.
75. Id. at 399-400 (quoting 334 U.S. at 396) (footnote omitted and emphasis added by
Justice Brennan). Justice Blackmun, however, would have placed the emphasis on the last
sentence.




dle level scrutiny, not in terms of equal protection, but in terms of
the privileges and immunities clause.7"
Justice Brennan's analysis completely ignored the fact that the
Court in Toomer applied a greater scrutiny not because of the fact
of discrimination but because of the commercial interest involved
in this discrimination. The Court was justified in extensively ana-
lyzing the act because of the fundamental right involved. Immedi-
ately preceding the section that Justice Brennan quoted from
Toomer, the Court stated: "[lit was long ago decided that one of
the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is
that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality
with the citizens of that State."'" The Court in Toomer found that
shrimping was subject to stricter judicial scrutiny not because it was
shrimp fishing but because it was commercial shrimp fishing and
involved a right to livelihood." Justice Blackmun indicated that if
there had been any indication that Montana elk were hunted com-
mercially, then a greater scrutiny would have been called for in
Baldwin." The majority properly rejected Justice Brennan's theory
that the privileges and immunities clause is not concerned with the
concept of fundamental rights.
By so holding, the Court implicitly relied upon a belief that
principles of federalism and state sovereignty bar a broad activist
intervention on the part of the judiciary. Through its definition of
privileges and immunities in terms of rights fundamental to the
maintenance of a federal scheme, the Court in Baldwin attempted
to limit the ability of the federal judiciary to impose its own value
judgments onto a constitutional framework and thereby attempted
to prevent federal interference with a state's political process. 81
78. See id. at 402, 406 n.8. For the suggestion that nonresidence would not rise to the
level of a suspect class, see note 54 supra.
79. 334 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 407 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (reliance by the Court on the commerce clause
in order to justify its invalidation of the legislative act).
81. 436 U.S. at 388.
82. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), decided soon after Baldwin, the Court held
that an Alaska statute requiring residents be hired in preference to nonresidents was invalid
under the privileges and immunities clause. In Hicklin, Justice Brennan, writing for a unani-
mous Court, adopted the rationale of his dissenting opinion in Baldwin. Id. at 523-31. While
Justice Blackmun did not write a seperate opinion, it would seem that Justice Brennan's
heavy reliance upon the commerce clause in the latter part of the opinion, and the involve-
ment of the right to travel which is within the Baldwin definition of rights fundamental to
the maintenance of a national scheme, allows Hicklin to be read as being consistent with the
majority opinion in Baldwin. Id. at 531-34. Thus, it seems that a majority of the Court will
permit judicial interference with the political processes of a state under the privileges and
immunities clause, at least when there is a "mutually reinforcing" constitutional provision,
such as the commerce clause. A broader reading would indicate that a constitutional provi-
sion which affirmatively grants the federal government authority over that of a state would
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Thus, the privileges and immunities clause can be seen to re-
tain importance to the extent that it protects rights not recognized
as fundamental under the equal protection clause.13 But for those
who consider that the rights of nonresidents should be the same as
those of residents, and that protection of those rights always re-
quires more than the test of a rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose, the Court's decision may be viewed as rendering the
privileges and immunities clause superfluous; if the clause protects
only those rights found elsewhere in the Constitution, then those
provisions of the Constitution would be sufficient to protect those
rights.
It is doubtful that the Court will use all of the rights identified
under the privileges and immunities clause as an integral part of
future equal protection analysis. At least three factors suggest that
for certain members of the Court, the privileges and immunities
clause will have little appeal. First, the Court's implicit limitations
on the definition of "basic and essential activities"' make it un-
likely that the Court will be able to define further those activities
so as to include more rights than those traditionally recognized as
fundamental under Corfield or guaranteed elsewhere in the Consti-
tution.
Second, the relationship between the privileges and immunities
clause and the "privileges or immunities" language of the four-
teenth amendment remains unsettled." It is unlikely, however, that
the Court could, in the future, successfully define that relationship
in a way that would limit the application of the privileges and
act to reinforce mutually a right fundamental to the maintenance of the federal scheme. Id.
at 531-32. By looking only to previously interpreted constitutional provisions as a means of
giving content to rights under the privileges and immunities clause, the Court has limited
its ability to impose its own value judgments upon the state's political process.
83. Despite the theoretical implications of the Baldwin decision, the practical effect is
arguably minimal. Ever since the Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873) (privileges and immunities clause protects only the rights of federal citizen-
ship), litigants have looked to other parts of the Constitution to protect their rights and have
used the privileges and immunities clause only as a last resort. This has been true both before
and after most of the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. See,
e.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (overruled in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83
(1940)) (privileges and immunities clause provides immunity from tax imposed solely on
dividends and interest earned outside of state); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904)
(implicitly holding the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses not to be a privilege or
immunity); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (privileges and immunities clause did not
protect against cruel and unusual punishment); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875) (privi-
leges and immunities clause not violated by lack of trial by jury in state civil cases); Minor
v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (right to vote in state election not privilege or
immunity of United States citizenship-women constitutionally denied suffrage).
84. 436 U.S. at 387.
85. See note 35 supra.
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immunities clause in equal protection analysis. With the adoption
of the middle level scrutiny in equal protection analysis, it is more
likely that the two provisions will continue to be confused; even if
a fundamental right is not found under a privileges and immunities
analysis, greater scrutiny might be allowed in an equal protection
analysis on the basis of classification.
Finally, under the Court's definition of the privileges and im-
munities clause in Baldwin, the rights of individuals will continue
to be determined in conjunction with the rights of states. States will
be allowed to discriminate against nonresidents as long as such
discrimination results from a proper exercise of state powers.
Even so, to the extent that the principles of federalism are
inherent in the structure of the Constitution and govern its interpre-
tation, the Court's decision in Baldwin should be welcomed as a
recognition that the privileges and immunities clause provides more
than lip service. to the protection of needed constitutional rights
without allowing an aggessive judiciary to impose its value judg-
ments upon the Constitution or to interfere unnecessarily with the
political processes of state government. Thus, the Baldwin decision
acts to reaffirm the vitality of a provision of the Constitution impor-
tant to judicial notions of federalism without unnecessarily infring-
ing upon principles of state sovereignty.
JEAN G. HOWARD
Baird v. Bellotti: Abortion-The Minor's Right to
Decide
In the recent case of Baird v. Bellotti, a Massachusetts fed-
eral district court struck down state legislation providing for judi-
cial and parental intrusion into a minor's informed decision to
abort. The policies behind the statute and reasoning offered by
the court in its invalidation are examined below in light of rele-
vant case law and constitutional strictures. The author's explora-
tion of the present boundaries of minors' rights in the abortion
choice concludes with approval of the continued protection of
these rights by the court in Baird.
A minor, like an adult, has a constitutional right to be free of
unwarranted state intrusion into her decisionmaking in matters
concerning childbearing.' The scope of this freedom in the context
1. Carey v. Population Serve. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See generally Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as a
Suspect Classification?, 29 STA. L. REv. 627, 631-35 (1977); see also Rehnquist, The Adver-
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